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Abstract
We consider a class of Gaussian layered networks where a source communicates with a destination through L intermediate
relay layers with N nodes in each layer in the presence of a single eavesdropper which can overhear the transmissions of the
nodes in the last layer. For such networks we address the question: what fraction of maximum secure achievable rate can be
maintained if only a fraction of available relay nodes are used in each layer? In particular, we provide upper bounds on additive and
multiplicative gaps between the optimal secure AF when all N relays in each layer are used and when only k, 1 ď k ă N , relays
are used in each layer. We show that asymptotically (in source power), the additive gap increases at most logarithmically with ratio
N{k and L, and the corresponding multiplicative gap increases at most quadratically with ratio N{k and L. To the best of our
knowledge, this work offers the first characterization of the performance of network simplification in layered amplify-and-forward
relay networks in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Index Terms
Amplify-and-forward relaying, Secrecy rate, Layered relay networks, Diamond networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent broadcast nature of wireless channel makes wireless transmission susceptible to eavesdropping within the
communication range of the source. Traditionally security in wireless networks has mainly been considered at higher layers
using cryptographic methods. However, recent advances in computation technology pose serious threats to such frameworks,
motivating researchers to explore alternative security solutions which offer unbreakable and quantifiable secrecy. Physical layer
security has emerged as a viable solution. The fundamental principle behind physical layer security is to exploit the inherent
randomness of noise and communication channels to limit the amount of information that can be extracted at ‘bit’ level by an
unauthorized receiver. Physical layer security builds upon the pioneering results developed by Wyner [1] which established the
possibility of achieving information-theoretic security by exploiting the noise of communication channel and for the first time
showed that secure communication is possible if the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the destination channel.
Later in [2], Wyner’s result was extended to Gaussian wire-tap channels. These results are further extended to various models
such as multi-antenna systems [3], [4], multiuser scenarios [5], [6], fading channels [7], [8].
An interesting direction of work on secure communication in the presence of eavesdropper(s) is one in which the source
communicates with the destination via relay nodes [9]–[13]. In the existing literature such work has been considered in
one or both of the following two scenarios: (A) relay nodes employ relaying schemes, such as Decode-and-Forward (DF),
(B) the source communicates with the destination over a two-hop relay network. We argue that computationally complex
relaying schemes such as DF render end-to-end performance characterization intractable, without providing any performance
guarantee in general channel and network scenarios. Therefore, we consider one of the simplest relaying scheme: Amplify-
and-Forward (AF) that allows us to provide guarantees on the optimal performance over a wide range of channel conditions.
A node performing AF-relaying scales and forwards the signals received at its input. Further, with AF-relaying the end-to-end
performance characterization problem remains tractable for much larger class of networks than those that can be considered
with other relaying schemes.
The characterization of the optimal secure AF rate is a computationally hard problem for general layered network. Thus, in
this paper we introduce an approach based on network simplification to reduce the computational effort of approximating the
maximum achievable secure AF rate in general layered networks. Consider a network scenario where source s is connected
to a destination t via a network of wireless relays in the presence of an eavesdropper. The eavesdropper can overhear the
transmissions of a subset of relay nodes in the network. To characterize the maximum secure AF rate one has to optimize
it over the scaling factors of all relay nodes. However, there can be several relay nodes which contribute marginally to the
achievable secrecy rate. Shutting down those relays saves physical resources without compromising much on the performance.
At the same time, computational effort of calculating optimal secure AF rate is reduced greatly as now one needs to optimize
the secrecy rate over scaling factors of fewer relay nodes. In this paper we aim to understand what portion of the maximum
achievable secrecy rate can be maintained if only a fraction of available relay nodes are used.
Previous work on network simplification embraces two major threads: one pertaining to the characterization of the fraction
of achievable rate/capacity that can be maintained with a selected subset of available relay nodes and the other pertaining to
the design of efficient algorithms for the selection of a subset of the best relay nodes. In the first direction, for the Gaussian
N-relay diamond network, [14] characterizes the fraction of the capacity when k out of N available relay nodes are used.
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Fig. 1. An ECGAL network with 3 relay layers between the source s and the destination t. Each layer contains two relay nodes. The eavesdropper overhears
the transmissions from the relays in layer 2.
In [15], the work of [14] were extended to diamond network with multiple antennas at the source and the destination for
some scenarios. Authors in [16] provide upper bounds on multiplicative and additive gaps between optimal AF rates with and
without network simplification for the Gaussian diamond network and a class of symmetric layered networks. Recent work
in [17], characterizes the guarantees achievable over arbitrary layered Gaussian networks, however restricted to the selection
of exactly one relay from each layer. The performance guarantees for the scenario where a subset of two relays per layer is
selected from a network with two layers of three relays each is also provided. The progress in the second direction is made
by [18] and [19], where low-complexity heuristic algorithms for the selection of near-optimal relay subnetwork of a given
size from a layered Gaussian relay network is provided. Previously, in cooperative communication literature also, the notion
of relay selection has been used [20]–[22]. However, such prior work used relay subnetwork selection in a restricted sense
(selecting the best single relay node among N relays in one layer networks).
In the above-mentioned work the main objective was throughput maximization. To the best of our knowledge, no work
has been done hitherto towards the characterization of the performance of network simplification for wireless relay networks
in the presence of an eavesdropper with the objective of secrecy rate maximization which is an even harder problem. As a
first step in this direction, we provide the optimal secure AF rate characterization in the communication scenarios where the
source communicates with the destination over L layers of relay nodes pL ě 1q, in the presence of an eavesdropper which
overhears the transmissions of the nodes in the last layer and any number k of relay nodes in each layer are used, 1 ď k ă N .
The eavesdropper being a passive entity, a realistic eavesdropper scenario is the one where nothing about the eavesdropper’s
channel is known, neither its existence, nor its channel state information (CSI). However, the existing work on secrecy rate
characterization assumes one of the following: (1) the transmitter has prefect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel states,
(2) compound channel: the transmitter knows that the eavesdropper channel can take values from a finite set [23]–[25], and
(3) fading channel: the transmitter only knows distribution of the eavesdropper channel [7], [8]. In this paper, we assume that
the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is known perfectly for the following two reasons. First, This provides an upper bound
to the achievable AF secrecy rate for the scenarios where we have imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel. For
example, the lower (upper) bound on the compound channel problem can be computed by solving the perfect CSI problem
with the worst (best) channel gain from the corresponding finite set. Further, this also provides a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of achievability schemes in such imperfect knowledge scenarios. Second, this assumption allows us to focus on
the nature of the optimal solution and information flow, instead of on complexities arising out of imperfect channel models.
Organization: In Section II we introduce a general wireless layered relay network model and formulate the problem of
maximum achievable secrecy rate with amplify-and-forward relaying in such networks. Section III addresses the performance
of network simplification in the Gaussian N -relay diamond network, layered network with L “ 1 layer and computes additive
and multiplicative gaps between the maximum secure AF rates achievable when N and k pk ă Nq, relays are used. In
Section IV we consider a class of symmetric layered networks and compute additive and multiplicative gaps between the
optimal secure AF rates obtained when when N and k pk ă Nq, relays are used. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a pL`2q-layer wireless network with directed links. The source s is at layer ‘0’, the destination t is at layer ‘L`1’
and the relays from the set R are arranged in L layers between them. The lth layer contains nl relay nodes,
řL
l´1 nl “ |R|.
The source s transmits message signals to the destination t via L relay layers. However, the signals transmitted by the relays
in the last layer are also overheard by the eavesdropper e. An instance of such a network is given in Figure 1. Each node is
assumed to have a single antenna and operate in full-duplex mode.
At instant n, the channel output at node i, i P RY tt, eu, is
yirns “
ÿ
jPN piq
hjixjrns ` zirns, ´8 ă n ă 8, (1)
where xjrns is the channel input of node j in neighbor set N piq of node i. In (1), hji is a real number representing the
channel gain along the link from the node j to the node i and constant over time (as in [26], for example) and known (even
for the eavesdropper channels) throughout the network as in [10]–[12]. All channel gains between the nodes in two adjacent
layers are assumed to be equal - “Equal Channel Gains between Adjacent Layers (ECGAL)” networks [26]. Source symbols
xsrns,´8 ă n ă 8, are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance Ps that satisfy an average source power
constraint, xsrns „ N p0, Psq. Further, tzirnsu is a sequence (in n) of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zirns „ N p0, σ2q.
We assume that z1is are independent of the input signal and of each other. We also assume that the ith relay’s transmit power
is constrained as:
Erx2i rnss ď Pi, ´8 ă n ă 8 (2)
Each relay node amplifies and forwards the noisy signal sum received at its input. More precisely, relay node i, i P R, at
instant n` 1 transmits the scaled version of yirns, its input at time instant n, as follows
xirn` 1s “ βiyirns, 0 ď β2i ď β2i,max “ Pi{PR,i, (3)
where PR,i is the received power at node i and choice of scaling factor βi satisfies the power constraint (2).
Assuming equal delay along each path, for the network in Figure 1, the copies of the source signal (xsr.s) and noise signals
(zir.s), respectively, arrive at the destination and the eavesdropper along multiple paths of the same delay. Therefore, the signals
received at the destination and eavesdropper are free from intersymbol interference (ISI). Thus, we can omit the time indices
and use equations (1) and (3) to write the input-output channel between the source s and the destination t as
yt “
»– ÿ
pi1,...,iLqPKst
hs,i1βi1hi1,i2 ...hiL´1,iLβiLhiL,t
fiflxs ` Lÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j´1
»– ÿ
pi1,...,iL´lqPKlj,t
βljhlj,i1 ...βiL´lhiL´l,t
fifl zlj ` zt (4)
where Kst is the set of L-tuples of node indices corresponding to all paths from source s to destination t with path delay L.
Similarly, Klj,t is the set of L ´ l- tuples of node indices corresponding to all paths from the jth relay of lth layer to the
destination with path delay L´ l ` 1.
We introduce modified channel gains as follows. For all the paths between the source and the destination:
hst “
ÿ
pi1,...,iLqPKs
hs,i1βi1hi1,i2 ...hiL´1,iLβiLhiL,t (5)
For all the paths between the jth relay of lth layer to destination t with path delay L´ l ` 1:
hlj,t “
ÿ
pi1,...,iL´lqPKlj
βljhlj,i1 ...βiL´lhiL´l,t (6)
In terms of these modified channel gains, the source-destination channel in (4) can be written as:
yt “ hstxs `
Lÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j“1
hlj,tzlj ` zt, (7)
Similarly, the input-output channel between the source and the eavesdropper can be written as
ye “ hsexs `
Lÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j“1
hlj,ezlj ` zt, (8)
The secrecy rate at the destination for such a network model can be written as [1], RspPsq “ rIpxs; ytq´Ipxs; yeqs`, where
Ipxs; yq represents the mutual information between random variable xs and y and rus` “ maxtu, 0u. The secrecy capacity
is attained for the Gaussian channels with the Gaussian input xs „ N p0, Psq, where Erx2ss “ Ps, [2]. Therefore, for a given
network-wide scaling vector β “ pβliq1ďlďL,1ďiďnl , the optimal secure AF rate for the channels in (7) and (8) can be written
as the following optimization problem.
RspPsq “ max
β
rRtpPs,βq ´RepPs,βqs (9a)
“ max
β
„
1
2
log
1` SNRtpPs,βq
1` SNRepPs,βq

, (9b)
where SNRtpPs,βq, the signal-to-noise ratio at the destination t is:
SNRtpPs,βq “ Ps
σ2
h2st
1`řLl“1řnlj“1 h2lj,t (10)
and similarly, SNRepPs,βq is
SNRepPs,βq “ Ps
σ2
h2se
1`řLl“1řnlj“1 h2lj,e (11)
Given the monotonicity of the logp¨q function, we have
βopt “ argmax
β
rRtpPs,βq ´RepPs,βqs
“ argmax
β
1` SNRtpPs,βq
1` SNRepPs,βq (12)
However, so far, there exists no closed-form expression or polynomial time algorithm to exactly solve the problem (12) even
for general two-hop (diamond) relay networks except for few specific cases where eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded or
scaled version of destination channel [27] and solving it for general layered network with more than one layer is an even
harder problem. Therefore in this paper, based on the notion of network simplification [14], we introduce an approach to reduce
the computational effort of solving this problem by selecting the best subset of kl relays among the set of nl relays in the
lth layer. Thus the proposed scheme leads to an exponential reduction in the search space to solve the problem (12) without
significantly compromising on the optimal performance, in terms of additive and multiplicative gaps between the corresponding
performances, as we show below. In the following, we discuss the performance of this network simplification based approach
to approximate the maximum achievable secure AF rate first, for the symmetric Gaussian N-relay diamond networks and then,
for a class of symmetric layered networks.
III. PERFORMANCE OF NETWORK SIMPLIFICATION IN DIAMOND NETWORK
Consider the symmetric diamond network, layered network with only a single layer of relays between the source and the
destination, L “ 1, with N relay nodes. Using (10) and (11), the SNRt and SNRe in this case are:
SNRt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
přNi“1 βiq2h2t
1`
´řN
i“1 β2i
¯
h2t
and SNRe “ Psh
2
s
σ2
přNi“1 βiq2h2e
1`
´řN
i“1 β2i
¯
h2e
Lemma 1: For symmetric diamond network, βopt in (12) is:
β1,opt, ¨ ¨ ¨ , βN,opt “ βopt “
#
minpβ2max, β2glbq, if ht ą he,
0, otherwise
where
β2max “ PPsh2s ` σ2 and β
2
glb “
gffe 1
N2h2th
2
e
´
1`N Psh2sσ2
¯
Proof: To find the value of βopt that maximizes the corresponding secrecy rate, equating the partial derivative of the
secrecy rate in (12) with respect to βi to zero, we get a system of N simultaneous polynomial equations. Without any loss of
generality, subtracting the equation corresponding to the partial derivative with respect to β1 from the rest of N ´ 1 equations,
it is easy to prove that β1 “ β2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ βN “ β is the only root of this system of equations. Substituting this solution in one
of the equations, we get
β
`
N2h2th
2
epNPsh2s ` σ2qβ4 ´ σ2
˘ “ 0
This equation has the following two distinct and real solutions for the stationary points of the secrecy rate with respect to β:
βz “ 0, and β2glb “
gffe 1
N2h2th
2
e
´
1`N Psh2sσ2
¯
Now using the second derivative test, we can prove that when ht ą he, then βz and βglb are the points of global minimum
and maximum, respectively. Similarly, for he ą ht, βz and βglb can be proved to be the points of global maximum and
minimum, respectively. Given the convex nature of the secrecy rate function with respect to β for ht ą he and that βmax is
the largest value of the scaling factor β, we have the result β2opt “ minpβ2max, β2glbq, if ht ą he.
With these optimum scaling factors, the SNR at the destination with N relay nodes is given as follows
SNRNt,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
N2pβNoptq2h2t
1`NpβNoptq2h2t
(13)
We use superscript N to emphasize that the optimal scaling factors are computed for all the N nodes.
Similarly, the SNR at the eavesdropper with N relay nodes is given as follows
SNRNe,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
N2pβNoptq2h2e
1`NpβNoptq2h2e
(14)
Now consider the network simplification scenario where only k out of N available relays are used, 1 ď K ă N . Using
Lemma 1, we can solve secrecy rate optimization problem of (12) and obtain the optimal solution βkopt, given as follows:
pβkoptq2 “ min
 pβmaxq2, pβkglbq2(
where
pβkglbq2 “
gffe 1
k2h2th
2
e
´
1` kPsh2sσ2
¯
The corresponding optimal SNR at the destination and the eavesdropper is given as:
SNRkt,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
k2pβkoptq2h2t
1` kpβkoptq2h2t
(15)
SNRke,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
k2pβkoptq2h2e
1` kpβkoptq2h2e
(16)
Let
RNs “ 12 log
˜
1` SNRNt,opt
1` SNRNe,opt
¸
(17)
and
Rks “ 12 log
˜
1` SNRkt,opt
1` SNRke,opt
¸
(18)
denote the optimal secure AF rate achieved by using all N relays and any k relays out of available N relays of the diamond
network, respectively. In the following we compute the additive gap RNs ´Rks for large Ps and the multiplicative gap RNs {Rks
for small Ps.
Case I: β2opt “ β2max
RNs “ 12 log
¨˝
1` Psh2sσ2 N
2Ph2t
Psh2s`σ2`NPh2t
1` Psh2sσ2 N
2Ph2e
Psh2s`σ2`NPh2e
‚˛ (19)
Rks “ 12 log
¨˝
1` Psh2sσ2 k
2Ph2t
Psh2s`σ2`kPh2t
1` Psh2sσ2 k
2Ph2e
Psh2s`σ2`kPh2e
‚˛ (20)
lim
PsÑ8
RNs ´Rks “ lim
PsÑ8
1
2
log
«
1` N2Ph2tσ2
1` N2Ph2eσ2
ff
´ 1
2
log
«
1` k2Ph2tσ2
1` k2Ph2eσ2
ff
ď lim
PsÑ8
1
2
log
«ˆ
N
k
˙2 1` k2Ph2eσ2
1` N2Ph2eσ2
ff
“ lim
PsÑ8
1
2
log
»– 1` σ2k2Ph2e
1` σ2N2Ph2e
fifl
ď 1
2
log
„
1` σ
2
Ph2e
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
(21)
lim
PsÑ0
RNs {Rks “ lim
PsÑ0
log
»–1` Psh2sσ2 N2Ph2tσ2`NPh2t
1` Psh2sσ2 N
2Ph2e
σ2`NPh2e
fiflOlog
»–1` Psh2sσ2 k2Ph2tσ2`kPh2t
1` Psh2sσ2 k
2Ph2e
σ2`kPh2e
fifl
paqď lim
PsÑ0
ˆ
N
k
˙2˜ 1` kPh2eσ2
1`N Ph2tσ2
¸˜
1` kPh2tσ2 ` k2 Psh
2
s
σ2
Ph2t
σ2
1`N Ph2eσ2 `N2 Psh
2
s
σ2
Ph2e
σ2
¸
ď
ˆ
N
k
˙2˜ 1` kPh2eσ2
1`N Ph2tσ2
¸
h2t
h2e
ď
ˆ
N
k
˙„
1` σ
2
P
ˆ
1
kh2e
´ 1
Nh2t
˙
where paq follows from the fact that the arguments of logp.q in the numerator and denominator (say x and y respectively) are
greater than 1 for ht ą he (condition for non-zero secrecy rate), and under the limit Ps Ñ 0 and comparable ht and he the
arguments are close to 1. Thus the numerator can be tightly bounded from above by x´ 1 and similarly, denominator can be
tightly lower bounded by py ´ 1q{y.
Case II: β2opt “ β2glb
Substituting for βNopt in (13) and (14) and subsequently substituting the results in (17), we get
RNs “ 12 log
»———–
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1`heht
c
1`NPsh2s
σ2
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` hthe
c
1`NPsh2s
σ2
fiffiffiffifl (22)
Similarly,
Rks “ 12 log
»———–
1` kPsh2s{σ2
1`heht
c
1` kPsh2s
σ2
1` kPsh2s{σ2
1` hthe
c
1` kPsh2s
σ2
fiffiffiffifl (23)
Thus, we have
lim
PsÑ8
RNs ´Rks “ lim
PsÑ8
1
2
log
»–1` hthe
b
NPsh2s
σ2
1` heht
b
NPsh2s
σ2
1` heht
b
kPsh2s
σ2
1` hthe
b
kPsh2s
σ2
fifl
ď lim
PsÑ8
1
2
log
»–1` hthe
b
NPsh2s
σ2
1` hthe
b
kPsh2s
σ2
fifl
pbqď 1
4
log
ˆ
N
k
˙
(24)
where pbq follows from the fact that p1` xq{p1` yq ď x{y for x ě y.
And
lim
PsÑ0
RNs
RKs
“ lim
PsÑ0
log
¨˝
1` NPsh2s{σ21`he{ht
1` NPsh2s{σ21`ht{he
‚˛O log
¨˝
1` kPsh2s{σ21`he{ht
1` kPsh2s{σ21`ht{he
‚˛
pcqď lim
PsÑ0
ˆ
N
k
˙˜
ht ` he ` kPsh
2
s
σ2 ht
ht ` he `N Psh2sσ2 he
¸
ď max
"
N
k
,
ht
he
*
(25)
where pcq follows from the same argument as paq.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF NETWORK SIMPLIFICATION IN LAYERED NETWORK
In this section we analyze the performance of network simplification in ECGAL networks with two or more layers of
relays between the source and the destination and each relay performing amplify-and-forward on its input signal. This is a
generalization of the symmetric diamond network configuration considered in Section III above. For the ease of presentation,
consider ECGAL networks where each layer of relay nodes has N relays and all relay nodes have the same transmit power
constraint EX2 ď P .
Using (10) and (11), the SNRt and SNRe in this case are:
SNRt “ Ps
σ2
h2sH
2
1,L´1
´řN
n“1 βL,n
¯2
h2t´řL´1
i“1G2i,L´ 1¯
´řN
n“1βL,n¯
2
h2t
´`řN
n“1 β2L,n¯ h2t `1
(26)
SNRe “ Ps
σ2
h2sH
2
1,L´1
´řN
n“1 βL,n
¯2
h2e´řL´1
i“1G2i,L´ 1¯
´řN
n“1βL,n¯
2
h2e
´`řN
n“1 β2L,n¯ h2e `1
(27)
where
H2i,j “
jź
k“i
˜
Nÿ
n“1
βk,n
¸2
h2k
G2i,j “
˜
Nÿ
n“1
β2i,n
¸
h2i
jź
k“i`1
˜
Nÿ
n“1
βk,n
¸2
h2k
The optimum solution βopt of problem (12) for an ECGAL network with N relay nodes in each layer is given by the following
two lemmas:
Lemma 2: For a given sub-vector pβ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,βL´1q, the sub-vector βL,opt “ pβL,1,opt, ¨ ¨ ¨ , βL,N,optq of the optimum scaling
factors for the nodes in the Lth layer is:
β2L,1,opt “ . . . “ β2L,N,opt “ β2L,opt “
#
minpβ2L,max, β2L,glbq, if ht ą he,
0, otherwise
where
β2L,glb “ 1
Nhthep1`NBq
b
1` Psσ2 NA1`NB
(28)
with A “ h2sH21,L´1 and B “
řL´1
i“1 G2i,L´1.
Proof:
To find the value of βL,opt that maximizes the corresponding secrecy rate, equating the partial derivative of the secrecy rate
in (12) with respect to βL,n to zero, we get a system of N simultaneous polynomial equations. Without any loss of generality,
subtracting the equation corresponding to the partial derivative with respect to βL,1 from the rest of N ´1 equations, it is easy
to prove that βL,1 “ βL,2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ βL,N “ βL(say) is one of the roots of this system of equations. Substituting this solution
in one of the equations, we get
βLpN2h2th2eβ4Lp1`NBq
`
1`NB `ANPs{σ2
˘´ 1q “ 0
This equation has the following two distinct and real solutions for the stationary points of the secrecy rate with respect to βL:
βL,z “ 0, and β2L,glb “ 1
Nhthep1`NBq
b
1` Psσ2 NA1`NB
Now using the second derivative test, we can prove that when ht ą he, then βL,z and βL,glb are the points of global minimum
and maximum, respectively. Similarly, for he ą ht, βL,z and βL,glb can be proved to be the points of global maximum and
minimum, respectively. Given the convex nature of the secrecy rate function with respect to βL for ht ą he and that βL,max
is the largest value of the scaling factor βL, we have the result
β2L,opt “ minpβ2L,max, β2L,glbq, if ht ą he
Lemma 3: For ECGAL layered networks,
pβ1,opt, . . . ,βL´1,optq “ pβ1,max, . . . ,βL´1,maxq,
where
β21,1,max“ ¨ ¨ ¨ “β21,N,max“β21,max“ PPsh2s ` σ2 ,
β2l,1,max“ ¨ ¨ ¨ “β2l,N,max“β2l,max“ PPRx,l , lPt2,¨ ¨ ¨,L´1u (29)
with PRx,l “ Psh2sH21,l´1 `
”řl´1
j“1G2j,l´1 ` 1
ı
σ2
Proof: With optimum value of the scaling factors for the nodes in the last layer from Lemmas 2, the problem (12) of
computing the optimal network-wide scaling vector reduces to
βopt “ argmax
pβ1,...,βL´1,βL,optq
1` SNRt
1` SNRe .
Similar to [28, lemma 3] for linear chain networks, we can show that 1`SNRt1`SNRe is a quasi-convex function of βL´1 in the
interval r´βL´1,max,βL´1,maxs for a given sub-vector pβ1, . . . ,βL´2q of scaling factors of first L ´ 2 relay layers and
optimum sub-vector βL,opt of the optimum scaling factors of the last relay layer. Thus, βL´1,opt “ βL´1,max. Carrying out
this process successively for relays in layer L´ 2, . . . , 1, proves the lemma.
Therefore, βNopt can be written as β
N
opt “ pβN1,max, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,βNL´1,max,βNL,optq. We use superscript N to emphasize that the
optimal scaling factors are computed for N nodes in each layer.
With these optimum scaling factors, the SNR at the destination with N relay nodes in each layer of a layered network with
L relay layers is given as follows
SNRNt,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
´śL
l“1pNβNl hlq
¯2
1`N řLl“1 ´βNl hlśLj“l`1pNβNj hjq¯2 (30)
where
βNl “ βNl,max, l “ t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , L´ 1u, and βNL “ βNL,opt
Similarly, the SNR at the eavesdropper with N relay nodes in each layer is given as follows
SNRNe,opt “
Psh
2
s
´śL´1
l“1 pNβNl hlqNβNL he
¯2 {σ2
1`N `βNL he˘2 `N řL´1l“1 ”βNl hl ´śL´1j“l`1pNβNj hjq¯NβNL heı2 (31)
Now consider the network simplification scenario where only k out of N available relays in each layer are used. Using
Lemma 2 and 3, we can solve secrecy rate optimization problem of (12) and obtain the optimal solution βkopt “
`
βk1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , βkL
˘
,
where βkl is the optimum scaling factor for all the nodes in layer l and is given as follows:`
βkl
˘2 “ `βkl,max˘2 , l “ t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , L´ 1u`
βkL
˘2 “ min!`βkL,max˘2 , `βkL,glb˘2)
where `
βkl,max
˘2 “ P
Psh2s
śl´1
i“1pkβki hiq2 `
„
k
řl´1
i“1
´
βki hi
śl´1
j“i`1pkβkj hjq
¯2 ` 1σ2 , (32)`
βkL,glb
˘2 “ 1
khLhe p1` kBq
b
1` Psσ2 kA1`kB
(33)
with A “ h2s
´śL´1
l“1 kpβkl qhl
¯2
, and B “
´řL´1
l“1 kpβkl q2h2l
śL´1
i“l`1k2pβki q2h2i
¯
The corresponding optimal SNR at the destination and the eavesdropper is given as:
SNRkt,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
´śL
l“1pkβkl hlq
¯2
1` křLl“1 ´βkl hlśLj“l`1pkβkj hjq¯2 (34)
SNRke,opt “
Psh
2
s
´śL´1
l“1 pkβkl hlqkβkLhe
¯2 {σ2
1` k `βkLhe˘2 ` křL´1l“1 ”βkl hl ´śL´1j“l`1pkβkj hjq¯ kβkLheı2 (35)
Let
RNs “ 12 log
˜
1` SNRNt,opt
1` SNRNe,opt
¸
(36)
and
Rks “ 12 log
˜
1` SNRkt,opt
1` SNRke,opt
¸
(37)
denote the optimal secure AF rate achieved by using all N relays and any k relays out of available N relays in each layer of
the ECGAL network, respectively. In the following we compute the additive gap RNs ´Rks for large Ps and the multiplicative
gap RNs {Rks for small Ps.
Before discussing the upper-bounds on the additive and multiplicative gaps for ECGAL networks with arbitrary number of
relay layers, consider the following example where we compute such bounds for an ECGAL network with two layers of relay
nodes pL “ 2q for any N and k.
Example 1: Consider an ECGAL network with two layers of relay nodes between the source and the destination, L “ 2.
Case I: β22,opt “ β22,max.
Using (30) and (31), we have for this network
SNRNt,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
N2β21h
2
1N
2
`
βN2
˘2
h22
1`N β`N2 2˘h22`Nβ21h21N 2` βN2 2˘h22
(38)
SNRNe,opt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
N2β21h
2
1N
2
`
βN2
˘2
h2e
1`N β`N2 2˘h2e`Nβ21h21N 2` βN2 2˘h2e
(39)
with
β21 “ β21,max “ PPsh2s ` σ2 (40)
β`N2
2˘ “`βN2,max 2˘“ PPsh2sN2β21h21`σ2p1`Nβ21h21q (41)
Substituting for β1 and
`
βN2
˘
in (38) and (39) and subsequently substituting the results in (36), we get
RNs “ 12 log
»—————–
1`
Psh
2
s
σ2
N2Ph21
σ2
N2Ph22
σ2
Psh2s
σ2
„
N2Ph21
σ2
`NPh22
σ2
`1

`1`NPh21
σ2
`NPh22
σ2
`NPh21
σ2
N2Ph22
σ2
1`
Psh2s
σ2
N2Ph21
σ2
N2Ph2e
σ2
Psh2s
σ2
„
N2Ph21
σ2
`NPh2e
σ2
`1

`1`NPh21
σ2
`NPh2e
σ2
`NPh21
σ2
N2Ph2e
σ2
fiffiffiffiffiffifl (42)
Similarly,
Rks “ 12 log
»—————–
1`
Psh
2
s
σ2
k2
Ph21
σ2
k2
Ph22
σ2
Psh2s
σ2
„
k2
Ph21
σ2
`k Ph22
σ2
`1

`1`k Ph21
σ2
`k Ph22
σ2
`k Ph21
σ2
k2
Ph22
σ2
1`
Psh2s
σ2
k2
Ph21
σ2
k2
Ph2e
σ2
Psh2s
σ2
„
k2
Ph21
σ2
`k Ph2e
σ2
`1

`1`k Ph21
σ2
`k Ph2e
σ2
`k Ph21
σ2
k2
Ph2e
σ2
fiffiffiffiffiffifl (43)
Thus, we have
lim
PsÑ8
RNs ´Rks “ 12 log
»———–
1` N2Ph22{σ2
1`
h22
Nh21
` σ2
N2Ph21
1` k2Ph22{σ2
1`
h22
kh21
` σ2
k2Ph21
1` k2Ph2e{σ2
1` h2e
kh21
` σ2
k2Ph21
1` N2Ph2e{σ2
1`
h2e
Nh21
` σ2
N2Ph21
fiffiffiffifl
ď 1
2
log
„
1` h
2
2
h21
ˆ
1
k
´ 1
N
˙`
σ2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` 1
2
log
„
1` σ
2
Ph2e
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙`
σ2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙`
σ4
Ph21Ph
2
e
ˆ
1
k4
´ 1
N4
˙
(44)
and
lim
PsÑ0
RNs
Rks
“ lim
PsÑ0
log
»———–
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
N2P
„
1
h21
` 1
h22
` σ2
Nh21h
2
2P

1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
N2P
„
1
h21
` 1
h2e
` σ2
Nh21h
2
eP

fiffiffiffifl
O
log
»———–
1` kPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
k2P
„
1
h21
` 1
h22
` σ2
kh21h
2
2P

1` kPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
k2P
„
1
h21
` 1
h2e
` σ2
kh21h
2
eP

fiffiffiffifl
ď Nˆ
k
4˙
˜
1`N Ph21σ2
1`kPh21σ2
¸˜
1`kPh21σ2 `kPh
2
e
σ2 `k3 Ph
2
1
σ2
Ph2e
σ2
1`N Ph21σ2 `N Ph
2
2
σ2 `N3 Ph
2
1
σ2
Ph22
σ2
¸˜
1`kPh21σ2 `kPh
2
2
σ2 `k3 Ph
2
1
σ2
Ph22
σ2
1`N Ph21σ2 `N Ph
2
e
σ2 `N3 Ph
2
1
σ2
Ph2e
σ2
¸
ď
ˆ
N
k
2˙ „
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` σ
2
P
ˆ
1
k2h2e
´ 1
N2h22
˙
` σ
2
Ph21
σ2
P
ˆ
1
k3h2e
´ 1
N3h22
˙
(45)
Case II: β22,opt “ β22,glb.
From Lemma 2, we have `
βN2,glb
˘2 “ 1
Nh2hep1`N2β21h21q
b
1` Psh2sσ2 N
3β21h
2
1
1`N2β21h21
(46)
Substituting for β1 and
`
βN2
˘
in (38) and (39) and subsequently substituting the results in (36), we get
RNs “ 12 log
»————–
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
N2Ph21
«
1`Psh2s
σ2
`heh2D
c
1`Psh2s
σ2
N3Ph21
σ2
D
ff
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
N2Ph21
«
1`Psh2s
σ2
`h2heD
c
1`Psh2s
σ2
N3Ph21
σ2
D
ff
fiffiffiffiffifl (47)
with D “ 1` Psh2sσ2 ` N
2Ph21
σ2 .
Similarly,
Rks “ 12 log
»————–
1` kPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
k2Ph21
«
1`Psh2s
σ2
`heh2D1
c
1`Psh2s
σ2
k3Ph21
σ2
D1
ff
1` kPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
k2Ph21
«
1`Psh2s
σ2
`h2heD1
c
1`Psh2s
σ2
k3Ph21
σ2
D1
ff
fiffiffiffiffifl (48)
with D1 “ 1` Psh2sσ2 ` k
2Ph21
σ2 .
Thus, we have
lim
PsÑ8
RNs ´Rks “ 12 log
»———–
1` N3Ph21{σ2
1`heh2
c
1`
N3Ph21
σ2
1` k3Ph21{σ2
1`heh2
c
1`
k3Ph21
σ2
1` k3Ph21{σ2
1`h2he
c
1`
k3Ph21
σ2
1` N3Ph21{σ2
1`h2he
c
1`
N3Ph21
σ2
fiffiffiffifl
ď 1
2
log
»–ˆN
k
˙3 1` heh2b1` k3Ph21σ2
1` heh2
b
1`N3Ph21σ2
1` h2he
b
1` k3Ph21σ2 ` k
3Ph21
σ2
1` h2he
b
1`N3Ph21σ2 `N
3Ph21
σ2
1` h2he
b
1`N3Ph21σ2
1` h2he
b
1` k3Ph21σ2
fifl
ď 3
4
log
ˆ
N
k
˙
` 1
2
log
«
1` σ
2
Ph21
«"
1
k3
´ 1
N3
*
` h2
he
#c
1
k6
` Ph
2
1
k3σ2
´
c
1
N6
` Ph
2
1
N3σ2
+ffff
(49)
and
lim
PsÑ0
RNs
RKs
“ lim
PsÑ0
log
¨˚
˚˝˚ 1` NPsh
2
s{σ2
1` σ2
N2P
ˆ
1
h21
` he
h21h2
`N2Phe
σ2h2
˙
1` NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
N2P
ˆ
1
h21
` h2
h21he
`N2Ph2
σ2he
˙
‹˛‹‹‚
O
log
¨˚
˚˝˚1` KPsh
2
s{σ2
1` σ2
K2P
ˆ
1
h21
` he
h21h2
`K2Phe
σ2h2
˙
1` KPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2
K2P
ˆ
1
h21
` h2
h21he
`K2Ph2
σ2he
˙
‹˛‹‹‚
ď lim
PsÑ0
ˆ
N
k
3˙
”
1`k2 Ph21σ2
ı
ph2`heq`k3 Psh
2
s
σ2
Ph21
σ2 h2”
1`N2 Ph21σ2
ı
ph2`heq`N3 Psh2sσ2 Ph
2
1
σ2 he
ďmax
$&%
ˆ
N
k
˙3 ´1` k2 Ph21σ2 ¯´
1`N2 Ph21σ2
¯ , h2
he
,.-
ď max
"ˆ
N
k
˙„
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
,
h2
he
*
(50)
for arbitrary N and k relays in each layer. 
However, for ECGAL networks with arbitrary number of relay layers, it is analytically hard to compute such upper-bounds
on the additive and multiplicative gaps between the optimal end-to-end performances with and without network simplification
for any N and k. Therefore, in the following we attempt to analyze the scaling behavior of such upper bounds with large N
and k.
Case I: β2L,opt “ β2L,max.
Using (29) and (32), we have for large N and k:
pfor PsÑ8q
lź
i“1
`
βNi
˘2“ P {pPsh2sq
N2pl´1q
l´1ś
i“1
h2i
, 1 ď l ď L (51)
lź
i“1
`
βki
˘2“ P {pPsh2sq
k2pl´1q
l´1ś
i“1
h2i
, 1 ď l ď L (52)
pfor PsÑ0q
lź
i“1
`
βNi
2˘“ P {σ
2
N2pl´1q´ 1
l´1ś
i“1
h2i
, 1 ď l ď L (53)
lź
i“1
`
βki
˘2“ P {σ2
k2pl´1q´1
l´1ś
i“1
h2i
, 1 ď l ď L (54)
Then from (30), (31) and (51) we obtain for large N and Ps Ñ8:
SNRNt „ N
2Ph2L
σ2
`
1` aN
˘ , and SNRNe „ N2Ph2e
σ2
´
1` h2e
h2L
a
N
¯ (55)
where, a “ h2L
řL´1
l“1
1
h2l
Similarly, from (34), (35) and (52) we obtain for large k and Ps Ñ8:
SNRkt „ k
2Ph2L
σ2
`
1` ak
˘ , and SNRke „ k2Ph2e
σ2
´
1` h2e
h2L
a
k
¯ (56)
And for large N and k, and Ps Ñ 0, from (30), (31) and (53) we obtain
SNRNt „ NPsh
2
s{σ2
1` σ2
N2Ph2L
”
1` h2L
h21
` bN
ı , and SNRNe „ NPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2N2P
”
h2L
h2e
` h2L
h21
` bN
ı (57)
and from (34), (35) and (54)
SNRkt „ kPsh
2
s{σ2
1` σ2
k2Ph2L
”
1` h2L
h21
` bk
ı , and SNRke „ kPsh2s{σ2
1` σ2k2P
”
h2L
h2e
` h2L
h21
` bk
ı (58)
where, b “ h2L
řL´1
i“2
1
h2i
.
With these results we are now ready to compute the upper bound on additive and multiplicative gap between the optimal
performance of AF relaying with and without network simplification.
First, we consider the upper bound on the additive gap. Substituting the SNR values from (55) and (56) in (36) and (37)
respectively, we obtain the following upper bound on the additive gap R¯Ns ´ R¯ks for Ps Ñ8 and asymptotically large N and
k satisfying N, k “ opPsq:
R¯Ns ´R¯ks ď 12 log
„
1`a
ˆ
1
k
´ 1
N
˙
` 1
2
log
„
1`a σ
2
Ph2L
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙`
σ2
Ph2e
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
(59)
Next, we consider the upper bound on the multiplicative gap. Substituting the SNR values from (57) and (58) in (17) and
(18) resp., we obtain the following upper bound on the multiplicative gap R¯Ns {R¯ks for Ps Ñ 0 and asymptotically large N
and k satisfying N, k “ op1{Psq:
R¯Ns
R¯ks
ď
ˆ
N
k
2˙ „
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` σ
2
P
ˆ
1
k2h2e
´ 1
N2h2L
˙
` σ
2
Ph2L
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙
b

(60)
Case II: β2L,opt “ β2L,glb.
From (28) and (51) we have, for Ps Ñ8 and asymptotically large N :`
βNL,glb
˘2“ 1
NhLhe
”
1`h2L´1
řL´2
l“1 1{h2l
ıc
1` N3Ph2L´ 1{σ2
1`h2L´ 1
řL´2
l“1 1{h2l
(61)
Thus, from (30) and (31) we have, for Ps Ñ8 and asymptotically large N :
SNRNt,opt„ N
3Ph2L{σ2
N
3
2he
a
a`aP {σ2 , SNR
N
e,opt„ k
3Ph2L{σ2
k
3
2he
a
a`aP {σ2 (62)
Similarly, for Ps Ñ8 and asymptotically large k we have:
SNRkt,opt „ k
3Ph2L{σ2
k
3
2he
a
a`aP {σ2 , SNR
k
e,opt „ k
3Ph2L{σ2
k
3
2he
a
a`aP {σ2 (63)
Substituting these SNR values from (62) and (63) in (17) and (18) respectively, we obtain the following upper bound on
additive gap R¯Ns ´ R¯ks for Ps Ñ8:
R¯Ns ´ R¯ks ď34 log
ˆ
N
K
˙
` 1
2
log
«
1`
d
σ2a
Ph2e
ˆ
1
K
3
2
´ 1
N
3
2
˙
` σ
2a
Ph2L
ˆ
1
K3
´ 1
N3
˙ff
(64)
Now, we consider the upper bound on the multiplicative gap for Ps Ñ 0. From (28) and (53) we have, for Ps Ñ 0 and
asymptotically large N : `
βNL,glb
˘2 “ 1
NhLheh2L´1
´
N3P
σ2 ` Nh21 `
řL´1
i“2
1
h2i
¯ (65)
Thus, from (30) and (31) we have, for Ps Ñ 0 and asymptotically large N :
SNRNt,opt „ Psh
2
s
σ2
N4Ph2L{σ2
hLhe
ˆ
N3P
σ2
` N
h21
`řL´1i“2 1h2
i
˙
1` hLhe
, and SNRNe,opt „Psh
2
s
σ2
N4Ph2e{σ2
hLhe
ˆ
N3P
σ2
` N
h21
`řL´1i“2 1h2
i
˙
1` hehL
(66)
Similarly, for Ps Ñ 0 and asymptotically large k we have:
SNRkt,opt „ Psh
2
s
σ2
k4Ph2L{σ2
hLhe
ˆ
k3P
σ2
` k
h21
`řL´1i“2 1h2
i
˙
1` hLhe
, and SNRke,opt „Psh
2
s
σ2
k4Ph2e{σ2
hLhe
ˆ
k3P
σ2
` k
h21
`řL´1i“2 1h2
i
˙
1` hehL
(67)
Substituting these SNR values from (66) and (67) in (36) and (37) respectively, we obtain the following upper bound on
multiplicative gap R¯Ns {R¯ks for Ps Ñ 0:
R¯Ns
R¯ks
ď max
"ˆ
N
k
˙„
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` σ
2b
P
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙
,
hL
he
*
(68)
The results on the asymptotic behaviour of additive and multiplicative gaps are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 4: For ECGAL network, the asymptotic additive and multiplicative gaps between the optimal performance of
Amplify-and-Forward relaying obtained in terms of maximum achievable secrecy rate with and without network simplification
are bounded from above as:
For βL,opt “ βL,max,
R¯Ns ´R¯ks ď12 log
„
1`a
ˆ
1
k
´ 1
N
˙
` 1
2
log
ˆ
1`a σ
2
Ph2L
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙`
σ2
Ph2e
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
ď 1
2
logr1`as ` 1
2
log
„
1`a σ
2
Ph2L
` σ
2
Ph2e

R¯Ns
R¯ks
ď
ˆ
N
k
2˙ „
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` σ
2
P
ˆ
1
k2h2e
´ 1
N2h2L
˙
` σ
2
Ph2L
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙
b

and, for βL,opt “ βL,glb,
R¯Ns ´ R¯ks ď34 log
ˆ
N
K
˙
` 1
2
log
«
1`
d
σ2a
Ph2e
ˆ
1
K
3
2
´ 1
N
3
2
˙
` σ
2a
Ph2L
ˆ
1
K3
´ 1
N3
˙ff
R¯Ns
R¯ks
ďmax
"ˆ
N
k
˙„
1` σ
2
Ph21
ˆ
1
k2
´ 1
N2
˙
` σ
2b
P
ˆ
1
k3
´ 1
N3
˙
,
hL
he
*
with a “ h2L
řL´1
i“1
1
h2i
and b “ h2L
řL´1
i“2
1
h2i
.
Discussion: The results in this lemma show that asymptotically (in source power), for the case where the constraint on scaling
factors of the nodes is satisfied with strict equality βL,opt “ βL,max, the additive gap is independent of the ratio N{k and
increases at most logarithmically with L and the corresponding multiplicative gap increases at most quadratically with ratio
N{k and L. Similarly, when the constraint on scaling factors of the nodes which eavesdropper snoops on is satisfied with strict
inequality, βL,opt “ βL,glb, the additive gap increases at most logarithmically with ratio N{k and L, and the corresponding
multiplicative gap increases at most linearly with ratio N{k and L.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Exact characterization of the optimum secure AF rate in general layered relay networks is an important but computationally
intractable problem. We take an approach based on the notion of network simplification to approximate the optimal secure
AF rate within small additive and multiplicative gaps in the symmetric Gaussian N-relay diamond network and a class of
symmetric layered networks while simultaneously reducing the computational effort of solving this problem. To the best of
our knowledge, this work provides the first characterization of the performance of network simplification in AF relay networks
in the presence of an eavesdropper. In future, we plan to extend this work to general layered networks.
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